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Abstract 
Based on analysis of economic growth indicators for 1989-2014, this 
article distinguishes the “emerging markets” of Central and Eastern Europe 
(with Russia included), from the other economies that fall in the broad 
‘emerging markets’ category. Following the post–1989 reforms, the countries of 
the region share many of the same typical institutional features as other 
“emerging economies”, but not necessarily the associated economic outcomes. 
What characterizes “emerging economies” is that they grow fast enough to 
systematically close the distance dividing them from the advanced economies, 
creating convergence. Departing from this pattern, Central and Eastern Europe 
(and Russia) have so far fallen short in terms of the growth rates, and the region 
as a whole has not made much progress in catching up. By more than doubling 
its national product Poland is the only notable exception in the region, although 
Slovenia may fit in the same category. At the other extreme, some of the 
economies actually lost two decades in terms of reducing the gaps, and some 
even fell further behind (e.g., Serbia, Ukraine). These findings have potentially 
serious implications for economic theory in general and for the presumption 
that globalization processes act as a unifying developmental force. 
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1. Introduction 
There are numerous examples of less developed economies which, once they 
began to converge with more developed economies, continued on the path until they 
closed the distance separating them from the developed economies. For instance, 
Japan, South Korea and China are in this category (with some residual uncertainty 
over China). For other economies, an initial spurt of growth reaches a low 
equilibrium and convergence comes to a halt. Not long ago, Brazil was considered 
almost as a textbook case of this category in international economics. During the 
first few post-war decades, the countries of the Soviet bloc began a convergence, 
but by mid-1980’s the catching-up lost some of its momentum. At this point, the 
region was still averaging one-third of the productivity rates for Western Europe.  
In 1989-90, with the collapse of the Soviet bloc, its former members 
embarked on dismantling their command economies established after the war by 
the Soviet Union. A market-run system, intended to imitate Western Europe, was 
first phased-in in Central Europe (Kornai 2006; Poznanski, Poznanska and Liu 
2012) and then what is now defined as Eastern Europe (i.e., Russia, Ukraine, and 
Belarus) joined in as well. The economies of Central and Eastern Europe turned 
into “emerging markets”, with typical institutional features such as: an “open” 
economy with low tariffs; robust domestic competition; private, and often largely, 
foreign banking systems; and limited unionization and flexible wages. Relatively 
stable prices and currencies are other features of the emerging markets that 
countries of the region acquired at this turning point.  
These changes were undertaken with the goal of resuming the catching-up 
process, particularly with Western Europe as the region’s role-model. 
Characteristics associated with “emerging markets” include not only their systemic 
characteristics and macroeconomic choices, but their above-the-average rates of 
investment and related rates of growth of their national product. The “emerging 
economies” also tend to be export-driven and show trade surpluses, or at least are 
not burdened with large trade deficits. In addition, their capital balance – i.e. the 
difference between inflow and outflow of capital – with respect to foreign 
investment is usually positive. As a rule, these factors have allowed most of the 
“emerging markets” by and large to reduce the distance separating them from the 
advanced economies.  
This has not been the case with Central and Eastern Europe, often called 
“transition” economies. When they moved forward with their market-oriented 
reforms, numerous projections were made about Central Europe eliminating its 
distance behind Western Europe in two, or at the most three, decades. Now 
however, over two decades later, it is evident that the early projections have not 
been proven correct – with the exception of Poland and Slovenia – and no 
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visible closing of the economic distance has taken place. In fact, in some 
economies in the region the initial gap has expanded (e.g., in Ukraine and 
Serbia) This puts Central and Eastern European economies into a special 
category, where the systemic features of “emerging markets” are not associated 
with “economic convergence” (e.g., Poznanski 2013). 
The critics of Poland’s approach to transition have to recognize that at least in 
terms of its overall performance, measured in growth rates, Poland is a success 
story, with growth rates that put her on par with the Latin American emerging 
economies that have been able to visibly close the gaps separating them from the 
advanced economies. This is, however, a relative success, since among the 
transition economies are also two Asian economies – China and Vietnam. In 
pursuing liberalization, they also joined the category of “emerging markets”, with 
China already producing two decades of the longest and fastest growth in post-war 
history. This has allowed China to reach rates of growth four times higher than in 
Poland, and another great success story, Vietnam, to reach rates nearly three times 
as high as Poland, and accordingly both have reached similarly higher rates of 
convergence levels.  
2. Twenty-Five-Year Economic Growth Record 
The year 1989 is chosen as the starting point to measure the relative 
economic performance of the “emerging economies”. As has been indicated, this 
is the approximate year when a full-scale liberalization started in the formerly 
state-planned economies in Central and Eastern Europe, including Russia.  
It should be noted that in China market-oriented reforms greatly accelerated from 
1985 onward. Historical real (i.e. corrected for inflation) GDP statistics are 
utilized for the calculation of growth patterns. Straight-forward indices, with the 
1989 GDP level taken as 100, are calculated for selected countries in specific 
regions. Averages for regions are calculated by dividing the total 2014 GDP for 
the countries of the region by their 1989 GDP level. Using this methodology, 
country indices are “weighted” by the size of their economies. 
Table 1 below summarizes the results for 55 “emerging economies” from 
five different regions, namely Asia, Latin America, Central and Eastern Europe as 
well as Central Asia (encompassing the remaining former Soviet republics, however 
with the Baltic States considered part of Central Europe). As a further point of 
reference for Central and Eastern Europe, growth indices for thirteen countries of 
Western Europe (from the “old” European Union) are included as well. This latter 
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addition is particularly relevant for evaluating the “catching-up” record of the 
Central and Eastern European economies. As previously said, Western Europe is 
the target by which these countries gauge their post-1989 performance.  
2.1. Long-Term Comparative Economic Growth 
According to Table 1 below, the fastest region during 1989-2014 was 
Asia, including a total of ten economies, with Taiwan, Singapore and South 
Korea and China among them. The GDP 2014 index for this group of emerging 
economies was 609, meaning that in the over 20-year period these economies 
grew by almost six times. This sample includes China, which registered a 2014 
GDP index of 990, or above nine times growth. The second fastest economy in 
the region was Vietnam with a 519 index for 2014. Given the fact that China’s 
economy accounts for about 50% of production in this region, a separate index 
was calculated with China excluded. For the Asian countries other than China, 
the 2014 GDP index was 411. 
Measured against the above index for Asia as a benchmark, the post-1989 
growth in Eastern Europe is merely a fraction. The 2014 GDP index for the 
sampled ten Central European economies was on average 221. Importantly, 
much of the growth came from Poland, the best performing country in the 
region with a 2014 index of 238. Excluding Poland, which also happens to be 
the single largest economy in the region, the average 2014 index for the 
remaining countries falls to 165. This index for these nine economies of Central 
Europe is roughly one-third of the above-mentioned corresponding index of 441 
reported by the Asian economies other than China. Furthermore, Central 
Europe’s index excluding Poland represents one-quarter of the 609 index for the 
whole of Asia, with China’s economy included. 
While the growth record for Central Europe is lacklustre in comparison 
with the Asians, who performed at the highest level among the “emerging 
economies”, in comparison to relatively less-successful countries of Latin 
America the region’s performance looks respectable. This is telling, since Latin 
American economies happen to have started their liberalization reforms about the 
same time as Central Europe and the countries that grew up out of the collapse of 
the Soviet Union in 1991, e.g. Eastern Europe and Central Asia. During 1989-
2014, while showing better performance than the rest of the region, Central 
Europe including Poland grew as a group close to the rate reported by Latin 
America, with its 2014 index of 209 meaning that during this time the Latin 
American region doubled its production.  
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If the record of Latin America is taken as the lowest threshold for 
defining an “emerging economy” as growing fast enough to converge, then 
among Central European economies only Poland can be said to have performed 
like a typical “emerging economy” (Slovenia, with its 183 index for 2014, might 
possibly be another exception,). If Poland’s economy is subtracted from the 
pool, the region grew by two-third in 1989-2014, which of course is less than 
the doubling of GDP reported by Latin America. In addition, among the 
majority that grew below the above-mentioned threshold, at least as many as 
three reported a GDP index for 2014 as low as one-quarter of the benchmark 
(i.e. 119 in Latvia; 126 in Bulgaria; 125 in Hungary).  
Table 1. Emerging Markets Real GDP 2014 Indices (1989=100; 2008=100) 
                                                
Region 
2014 
Index (1989=100) 
2014  
Index (2008 =100) 
Asia 
    China 
    Vietnam 
       without China 
609 
990 
519 
411 
146 
164 
141 
144 
Latin America 
    Argentina 
     Chile 
209 
256 
336 
118 
126 
125 
Central Europe 
   Hungary 
   Poland 
     without Poland 
221 
125 
238 
165 
106 
78 
118 
100 
South Central Europe 
    Serbia  
126 
79 
98 
105 
Eastern Europe 
     Belarus   
     Russia 
     Ukraine 
112 
204 
117 
65 
138 
124 
145 
90 
Central Asia 
     Kazakhstan 
198 
194 
139 
135 
Western Europe 
      Austria   
      Germany          
153 
165 
149 
99 
102 
105 
Turkey  242 111 
Egypt 267 114 
Morocco  220 113 
Algeria 176 108 
Source: Calculated from “Development Indicators. GDP and Growth Rates of GDP, 1989-2011”, 
World Bank, 2012. 
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Importantly, not counting Albania all countries of the South Central 
Europe (i.e., Albania, Bosnia, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia) 
showed a considerably slower economic growth during the 1989-2014 period 
than Central Europe, whether the fastest regional economy (Poland) is included 
in the sample or not. As an extreme for this region, Serbia reported for the 1989-
2014 period a negative index of 79, this also being the extreme for all the 
transition economies sampled in this quantitative study. While without Poland 
the 2014 index for Central Europe was 165, for the South Central European 
region the average was only 126.  
Extremely low rates have been also reported by some of the former Soviet 
republics that form the present Eastern Europe. Ukraine reported the negative 
index of 65, and for Russia the index was 107. In contrast, Kazakhstan reported 
an index of 194, which is above the average for Central Europe. The last 
member of the Eastern Europe, Belarus reported an index of 204, which was 
below the Central European leader Poland’s 238 index. The contrast between 
Central Europe and the two fast-growing economies of the former Soviet Union 
is intriguing, since both Kazakhstan and Belarus are considered relatively 
conservative with respect to their market reform programs, with Belarus often 
claimed to be an extreme case, alongside Uzbekistan. 
However, the former Soviet republics that constitute Central Asia showed  
a performance that is comparable to that of Central Europe. The 2014 index for 
the eight countries was around 198, so there is only a several point difference. 
Included in this group is Georgia with its 74 index, Moldova with its 69 index, 
and Tajikistan with its 107 index. With such poor results they all fall in the 
category of countries which lost over two decades of growth. However, within 
the group are also economies that match or even exceed the record of the best 
performing Central European economy, i.e. Poland. Turkmenistan reported an 
index as high as 345, and Uzbekistan reported 263.  
Of the 27 countries constituting Central and Eastern Europe and the 
former Soviet republics of Central Asia, only six of them showed a benchmark 
index of around 200 or more and were thus able to reduce their GDP-gap vis-à-
vis the advanced countries by some measurable degree. These countries are 
Poland and Slovenia from Central Europe; Belarus from Eastern Europe; and 
Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan from Central Asia. If the two 
formerly “state-run” Asian economies - China and Vietnam - are added, then the 
number of “transition economies” in the sample extends to 29 economies, with 
eight of them exceeding the 200 point benchmark that separates countries with 
visible convergence from those that liberalized without convergence.  
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Turning to Western Europe, the 2014 GDP index for the 15 European 
Union “old” members was 153. This is below the Central European 221 index 
as well as the region’s index of 165 when counted without Poland. Of the 27 
countries comprising Central and Eastern Europe, South Central Europe, and the 
former Soviet republics of Central Asia, only eight reported 1989-2014 growth 
rates higher than Western Europe as a group. Of these eight countries, three are 
from Central Europe, namely Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. The remaining 
countries in this group include Albania from South Central Europe, Belarus 
from Eastern Europe plus five Central Asian countries, namely Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, the latter with the 
fastest growing economy within the whole group of 27 economies.  
2.2. Responses to the 2008 financial crisis 
When the 2008 crisis shook the world, it marked the worst financial crisis 
that hit the advanced economies in the post-war period. By 2014, the total 
product of Western Europe (European Union – 15) still remained below the 
2008 level. Specifically, the GDP 2014 index (2008=100) was 99 for the 
advanced region of Europe. This was the first test for Central and Eastern Europe 
to see how resistant the region is to cross-border financial shocks originating in 
Western Europe. To the surprise of many, as a group the Central and Eastern 
European countries showed better economic performance in terms of growth. The 
respective 2014 index for Central Europe was 106, meaning it was 7 points higher 
than Western Europe in the six-year time span of 2008-2014.  
The most resistant economies of Western Europe showed a modest 
increase in production and ended up with a GDP 2014 index around 102. This 
group would include five economies, i.e., Belgium, Austria, France, Germany 
and Sweden (the latter being the most successful among them, with a 108 GDP 
index). Among the ten economies in this group which reported declines for 
2008-2014, the most severely damaged turned out to be the economies of 
Greece, with a 2014 growth index of 78, and Ireland with a respective index of 
96. Portugal also experienced difficulties with a 94 growth index for 2014, 
while the respective index for Spain was also 94 and for Italy the index was 93. 
Proportionally speaking, the number of Central European economies that 
suffered a decline from the financial shock has been lower than in Western 
Europe. Of the ten sampled countries of Central and Eastern Europe, two 
reported a visible increase in national product, namely Poland and Slovenia, 
with Poland having the distinct status of the best-performing European 
(including both West and East) economy in terms of growth. Poland’s GDP 
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2014 growth index (with 2008=100) was 118 and that of Sweden, indicated as 
the fastest growing Western European member, by a large margin. Of the 
remaining eight Central and Eastern European economies that sharpest decline 
was reported by Slovenia with 91 index, Hungary with 97 and Latvia with 98 
index. This is less than decline reported by the worst affected Western European 
economies (including Finland with 95 index in 2014).  
The lesson of the 2008 crisis is that joining the European Union did not 
render Central Europe immune to the financial shocks. The shocks were actually 
imported from Western European economies, with many of them reporting the 
most damaging downturns ever encountered in post-war Western Europe. 
Further, for some Western European economies this severe decline followed 
years of remarkable expansion, which had been taken as proof that liberalization 
pays off handsomely. For example, Ireland was praised as an example that 
globalization worked “miracles”. Its GDP index for the year 2000 (1989=100) 
was 217, compared to 128 index for Western Europe as a whole. But, as already 
mentioned, following four years of consecutive decline Ireland’s GDP index for 
2014 was 96, among the worst in the whole of Western Europe.  
Turning now to Latin America, growth statistics show that as a region 
these countries proved more resistant to the 2008 financial shock, at least in the 
sense that none in the sample witnessed a decline of national product through 
2014. The group as a whole reported an increase that averaged to a 2014 index 
equal to 118. This meant, however, that these economies considerably slowed 
down compared to the long-term average index of 209 achieved during the 
1989-2014 period. Some countries showed very impressive growth rates, raising 
their national product during this six-year span by one-third as in Peru) or one 
fourth, e.g., Argentina (whose economic performance defied those critics who 
predicted a painful and protracted recovery from its own severe financial crisis 
incurred by its default on foreign debt and steep devaluation). 
Central Europe fell not only behind Latin America, but also behind the 
“emerging economies” of Asia, which collectively enjoyed a 2014 growth index 
of 146 against the 2008 GDP base level, i.e. the equivalent of nearly one-half. 
This index is higher than that for Latin America and not matched even by the 
best performing member of Central Europe – Poland. If China is removed from 
the sample, the growth index for Asia is at 144, still higher than for any other 
group of “emerging economies”; still higher than for Poland alone; and also 
higher than that of the former Central Asian republics, which reported a very 
strong 2014 growth index of 138.  
For further comparison, Russia reported an index of 145 and Ukraine an 
index of 90 for the world crisis period 2008-2014. With this data the records for 
the former Soviet republics can be contrasted with that of individual “emerging 
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economies”, most notably with the “transition” economies of China and 
Vietnam. Not only were China and Vietnam not negatively affected by the 
financial crisis, they fared better than most of the Asian “emerging economies”, 
with India leading at 179, and followed by China reporting the 164 index and 
Vietnam coming next at 141. Among the formerly state-run economies in 
Central Asia, only Uzbekistan recorded a comparable index, namely 159 and 
Turkmenistan ended up with the 179 index. 
To broaden the geographic perspective, Table 1 provides information on 
the economic performance of some “emerging economies” from Middle East 
and North Africa, plus Nigeria. Of them, all demonstrated higher rates of growth 
for the 1989-2014 period than the comparable record achieved by Central and 
Eastern Europe, with Russia. The few selected countries of the Middle East and 
North Africa reported an average 2014 index against 1989 at the level of 232, 
which was higher than the average for Latin America and this for the economies 
of Central Europe achieved in the same time frame. Their index for the period of 
2008-2014 was hovering around 111, meaning comparable to Latin America 
and much stronger than the countries in Central Europe, as well as Russia and 
Ukraine in Eastern Europe. 
The most significant lesson is that - while the Central and Eastern European 
countries were more resistant to the 2008 financial shock than the advanced 
economies of Western Europe - they made very little progress in catching up. The 
differential in growth rates was not significant enough to allow Central and 
Eastern Europe to gain any visible ground in the “convergence game.” This 
lacklustre performance most stands in contrasts to the performance of the two 
Asian economies which also dropped their state-run systems for a market-based 
system, namely China and Vietnam. Interestingly, the Asian parts of the former 
Soviet Union have also proven more resistant to the 2008 cross-border financial 
shocks, which for first time in the post-war years came from the advanced world. 
3. Factors behind the slow convergence 
The question which arises is: How is it that the “emerging markets “of 
Central and Eastern Europe, together with Russia and the former Soviet 
republics, which by and large have liberalized their systems so much, have 
recorded growth rates insufficient to enable convergence in a reasonably short 
period of time? The existing pattern is so prevalent among these “transition 
economies” that one would expect more or less the same factors to be 
responsible for the pattern discerned here. At this stage of the discussion among 
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economists no consensus has been achieved as to the sources of this – as identified 
by us – paradox of these numerous cases of liberalization without convergence.  
That the region has been slow in closing the distance against the advanced 
economies is not in itself evidence of a failure of the “transition”. Naturally 
convergence is not the only measure of economic success. The region of Central 
and Eastern Europe and Russia with the former Soviet republics is better off on 
many respects, with greater access to imports, more product variety, and increased 
quality, all of which benefits domestic consumers. Further, opportunities have 
opened up for people to try their entrepreneurial talent, start businesses, and 
innovate production. The production structure has changed dramatically, and the 
structure of their foreign trade is now dominated by manufactured goods that are 
integrated into the structure of globally-operating multinationals. 
3.1. Suppressed total consumer demand 
One hypothesis concerning the possible reasons for the slow convergence is 
that domestic demand doesn’t provide a sufficient stimulus for production growth; 
in other words, the low rates of growth are demand-driven. This argument was 
raised already at the time when the region entered the post-1989 “transition 
recession” that shaved off over ¼ of the regional national product. According to 
the prevailing view, this downturn was caused by structural – supply-side – 
impediments, namely the presence of huge amounts of “unwanted production” 
which the state planners had developed in earlier years. A dissenting argument 
was raised, however, pointing to the demand side, namely a sharp decline in real 
wages combined with a drastic credit squeeze and a sharp increase in the interest 
charged (justified on the grounds of eradicating inflation and “strengthening” the 
currencies).  
The demand argument has been recently revived by Podkaminer (2013) in 
the context of the ongoing debate on how to cope best with the post-2008 
financial crisis and its aftermath. The prevailing view has been that austerity 
(higher unemployment and wage cuts etc.) is the remedy. But a small group of 
vocal Keynesian economists (e.g., Krugman in the United States, Laski in 
Europe) have called for “monetary easing” by allowing increased budgetary 
deficits and moderate price inflation. A retrospective examination of the real 
wage trends since 1989 seems to argue for the validity of the demand argument 
in explaining growth performance, both at the outset of the transition as well as 
in the years that followed. 
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The analysis reveals a continuous real wage repression, which by and 
large didn’t allow for real wages to increase by more than one-quarter during the 
1989-2012 period (Podkaminer 2013). Table 2 demonstrates that the notable 
exception is the Czech Republic, where after an initial decline of real wages to  
a 69.6 index in 1992, they recovered to reach an index of 154 in 2012, or by 
more than one-half. In Romania real wages reached 130 index points, and in 
Poland 124. Otherwise, most of the countries hovered around 110 points, or 
even allowed their real wages to stay at the pre-recession level, i.e., Lithuania 
with an index of 74 and Bulgaria with an index of 72. These low indices 
translate into low annual rates of growth in real wages, ranging from 1.9 % in 
Czech Republic and at the lower end of the positive spectrum to 1.2% in 
Romania, to -1.3% for Lithuania and -1.4 % for Bulgaria. 
It is instructive to compare the rates of real growth in wages with the real 
growth of national product in particular economies. This helps to get a sense of 
the extent to which the population at large participates in the appropriation of 
the expanding “pie”, meaning the national product. In the Czech Republic and 
Romania wages grew by more than their real domestic product. In the former 
case the gross domestic product index for 1989–2011 was 142, but real wages 
grew by 154 points. In the latter case of Romania the figures were 123 against 
139; while for Poland it was reverse, with the gross domestic product growing 
by 221 points while the real wages index was 124.  
Table 2. Average Real Wages in Eastern Europe 1989–2012 (1989=100) 
 
1989 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2005 2007 2009 2012 
Czech 
Republic 100.0 76.7 85.5 101.4 101.3 110.1 121.3 136.7 148.2 153.8 154.0 
Hungary 100.0 88.2 90.9 75.8 82.4 75.7 103.6 118.9 117.5 115.7 116.4 
Poland 100.0 73.3 74.4 80.7 88.2 93.3 96.3 102.1 112.0 121.0 124.5 
Slovakia 100.0 73.6 73.0 81.3 89.1 82.1 87.7 93.7 100.9 105.7 104.8 
Slovenia 100.0 60.6 73.5 80.3 83.9 87.6 92.9 99.2 106.0 110.8 111.0 
Estonia 100.0 40.0 45.1 48.8 56.1 63.7 72.8 88.0 111.0 108.9 110.0 
Lithuania 100.0 47.6 33.1 35.4 45.4 45.1 46.6 57.1 76.7 78.4 74.8 
Bulgaria 100.0 68.0 48.6 38.1 38.3 41.5 41.9 46.2 52.8 64.7 72.5 
Romania 100.0 74.7 62.4 76.7 61.7 62.8 67.5 94.5 118.2 135.6 130.3 
Source: Adapted from Podkaminer 2013, p. 16. 
Looking at another relatively fast growing economy, that of Slovenia, the 
gross national product increased by 190 index points, but real wages by only 
111, so as with Poland the gap was very substantial, indicating the declining 
share of wages in the total product. In Slovakia, the respective indices were 160 
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for gross national product, and 104 for real wages, meaning that in the over 
twenty years that have passed real wages in this country have basically not 
increased. In the extreme case of Bulgaria, wages declined to an index value of 72, 
while product increased by 122 points. In Lithuania the index for product was 119 
and for wages 75, indicating another case of an enormous gap. Finally, in Hungary 
the respective indices were 129 and 116. 
The above described phenomena constitute a rather unprecedented case of 
the distribution of gains from economic growth, certainly in light of the Chinese 
transition path, where phenomenal increase in the total national product has been 
accompanied by almost as rapid an increase in real wages, often 10% or more on an 
annual basis. This is actually in line with the patterns detected in other Asian 
economies that experienced “economic miracles”, e.g. Japan and South Korea. They 
all ensured a model of so-called “shared growth”, guaranteeing that all major groups 
would equally benefit from the growing national income and productivity as its 
principal source.  
3.2. “Labour drain” from Eastern to Western Europe 
Another factor which could be of importance is that - by and large - the 
countries in the region experienced a low rate of labour utilization, expressed in 
both high rates of official and unofficial unemployment, as well as in the large-
scale outflow of labour abroad. Previously free of unemployment, from 1989 
onward all the transition economies witnessed rapid unemployment, quickly 
reaching high levels, in Poland’s case as high as 15%. While Polish unemployment 
rates have measurably declined, it is not uncommon in these days to encounter such 
high levels unemployment in the region. 
High rates of unemployment were typically combined with an outflow of 
the labour force abroad, basically to Western Europe, and the numbers are very 
high by any standard. For example, in Poland at least 2 million people have left 
to seek work abroad, mainly to England, Ireland, Germany and Spain. At the 
same time workers from Ukraine and Russia migrate to find employment in 
Poland and elsewhere in the region. This outflow is fuelled by weak labour 
markets in Eastern Europe as well as by the wide-spread demographic stagnation in 
Western Europe, particularly in Germany, its largest single economy.  
During the recent 2008 financial crisis, both the rates of unemployment in the 
region and migration from the region have intensified, leading to in some instances 
to massive depopulation, mainly among the youth and skilled workers. For instance, 
since 2008 Lithuania’s population declined by 10% and Romania’s population fell 
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by 12%, mainly due to migration. The losses might be permanent, since migrant 
workers usually intend to settle and have families in Western Europe, whose 
leadership is very accommodating to this source of economic growth. This happens 
also to be a source of repressed growth in Central Europe, since the wealth created 
by these migrants tends to stay in the countries they move into. 
The case of Poland is instructive here, with the country reporting 10.5 
million persons employed in 1990, the first full year of transition. Due to initial 
reductions and the weak demand for labour, the number of persons employed 
declined permanently, settling at around 8.5 million people. This meant a reduction 
in the use of labour factor by 2 million people. In 2013, official statistics revealed 
that the unemployment rate is oscillating at around 13.5 – 14.5%, or around 2.2 
million persons in absolute numbers. This was close to the level reached two 
decades earlier during the 1989–1992 “transition recession” that shaved off almost 
20% of the gross national product. These 2.2 million represent nearly one quarter 
of the number of employed persons, meaning that after the transition and 
recession the economy has been moving forward at about one-quarter below its 
“potential” production growth. 
3.3. Foreign ownership of banking and insurance 
Another factor which might be potentially relevant is the specific 
structure of the financial system and related credit access. This structure is 
marked by high levels of foreign ownership, which have greatly helped to 
modernize the outdated financial system left behind from the communist times. 
In Central and South Central Europe banks and insurance companies are almost 
exclusively foreign-owned, with the majority of countries reporting around  
a 90% rate of foreign ownership of banking and insurance; Slovenia being an 
exception with foreign ownership accounting for 37% of total financial assets in 
2006. Importantly, the trends show these shares might actually further increase. 
As Table 3 demonstrates, ownership structure in Central Europe differs 
sharply from that found in the former Soviet republics or Russia itself. The level of 
penetration of the financial sector that is found in Eastern Europe is replicated only 
by Kyrgyzstan, and there are few former republics where this share is as high as 
30%, e.g., Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine (Table 3) There many cases, where the 
foreign presence is close to insignificant, as in Uzbekistan with a 1% share, 
Azerbaijan with 5%, and in Russia where this share is at 13%. There is no 
indication that the shares of foreign ownership of banking and insurance might 
increase in these countries. 
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For comparison purposes, not counting Great Britain foreign ownership in 
Western Europe seldom exceeds 20 % and hovers around 10 % (and is as low as 
5% in the financially powerful Germany). There are actually similar shares that are 
to be found in many “emerging economies” other than the “transition economies”, 
except for China where foreign ownership of banking is subject to strict controls 
and limits, which results in keeping the foreign presence under 3-5 %. But in Latin 
America, 25-30 % foreign ownership is not unusual, with only three cases that 
resemble Central and Eastern Europe. These cases are El Salvador with 78 %, 
Mexico with 82%, and Peru where the share is as high as 95%.  
Table 3. Share of banking assets held by foreign banks with majority ownership, 2006 (in %) 
Eastern Europe Former Soviet Union 
Albania 93 Armenia 31 
Croatia 91 Azerbaijan 5 
Czech Republic 96 Belarus 30 
Bosnia/Herzegovina 90 Georgia 32 
Bulgaria 72 Kazakhstan 24 
Hungary 94 Kyrgyzstan 75 
Latvia 52 Moldova 30 
Lithuania 92 Russia 13 
Macedonia 80 Ukraine 28 
Poland 73 Uzbekistan 1 
Romania 60   
Serbia 65   
Slovak Republic 93   
Slovenia 37   
Latin America Western Europe 
Argentina 25 Austria 21 
Bolivia 38 Denmark 19 
Brazil 25 France 10 
Chile 32 Germany 5 
Colombia 18 Italy 9 
El Salvador 78 Netherlands 10 
Guatemala 8  
Mexico 82  
Peru 95  
Uruguay 44  
Venezuela 32  
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Asia Africa 
Bangladesh 0 Algeria 9 
Cambodia 27 Angola 53 
China 0 Cameron 63 
India 5 Egypt 12 
Indonesia 28 Kenya 41 
Malaysia 16 Madagascar 100 
Mongolia 22 Morocco 18 
Pakistan 25 Mozambique 100 
Philippines 1 Nigeria 5 
Vietnam 0 Senegal 48 
Sri Lanka 0 South Africa 0 
Thailand 5 Sudan 20 
  Swaziland 100 
Middle East   
  Tanzania 66 
Iran 0 Tunisia 22 
Jordan 14 Uganda 80 
Lebanon 34 Zambia 77 
Turkey 4 Zimbabwe 51 
Yemen 0   
Source: World Bank 2008. 
Few economists have tried to estimate the correlation between the level of 
foreign “penetration” and the efficiency of financial sectors (se however the 
review article of Estrin 2009). There is no compelling research to make the 
argument that the impact is either positive or negative for economic growth. 
However, it seems reasonable to argue that the higher the foreign ownership 
controls, the more influence they can exert over the accessibility of means – like 
credit – for the formation of capital, i.e., investment. It could well be that at least 
until this point foreign banks in operation have – rationally – chosen a strategy 
to restrict investment credit as opposed to other allocations. The higher foreign 
ownership of banking and insurance in Central Europe might be a factor in 
keeping Central and Eastern European rates of income growth below their 
“potential” level.  
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3.4. Transfer out of profits and dividends 
The patterns detected in the banking/insurance sectors in Central Europe 
reflect a more general pattern, since in other sectors (including also other service 
sectors such as retail sales) foreign ownership also tends to enjoy a high share. 
With this systemic change, the investing processes have shifted towards foreign 
companies, usually belonging to major multinationals that come mainly from 
Western Europe. Accordingly, the level of internal investment is largely 
dependent on the inflow of foreign investment and the “strategic choices” made 
by the foreign-owned companies on the role these economies play in their 
operations, driven by profit margins and stock valuations (Hunya 2012). 
The extent to which foreign-owned corporations affect investment activities 
in Central and Eastern Europe is reflected in the rather unprecedented ratio of 
cumulative stock of foreign investment and the value of the gross national product. 
This ratio for the “old” 15 members of the European Union is under 25 % and is 
much less for typical “emerging “economies”, including China and Vietnam. With a 
stock of 530 billion dollars in 2011, foreign investment accounted for 13% of 
China’s gross domestic product, and for Vietnam the corresponding ratio was less 
than 10.0%. However, in Central and Eastern Europe the average ratio in 2012 
exceeded 60%, reaching as high as 100% in Bulgaria and 84% in Estonia. In 
Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia the ratios approach 70%, and at the 
lower range, Poland’s ratio was 43% and Slovenia’s 30%. 
The strong reliance on foreign direct investment is reflected in the ratio of 
foreign investment to fixed capital formation, which is calculated on an annual 
basis. For Central and Eastern Europe the average annual ratio during 2003–2011 
reached as high as 50% in Bulgaria and 33% in one of the Baltic States, Estonia. 
A similarly high ratio of foreign investment in total annual investment could be 
observed in Serbia. The lowest ratio was reported by Slovenia, a predictable result 
given its lowest level of foreign ownership, namely 6%. In the Czech Republic the 
ratio was 14 %, while Poland, Hungary and Slovakia reported a 17% ratio. Overall, 
the average for all these economies was 16%.  
Such a heavy dependence on foreign investment provides a link through 
which the Central European economies are subjected to external shocks,  
a relationship that manifested itself during the 2008 financial crisis. It is, however, 
this same channel through which these countries are assisted in lifting up their 
economies when Western Europe recovers. After a phenomenal increase in inward 
investment, their stock, with Russia included, has increased from $30 billion in 
2003 to $155 billion in 2008, or over five times (with Russia alone reporting an 
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increase from $8 billion to $70 billion). In a sharp reversal, foreign direct investment 
into the region collapsed to $70 billion (with as much as one-quarter of the overall 
decline taking place in the real estate sector) (Podkaminer 2013). 
Tapping foreign direct investment has yielded many remarkable benefits 
to the region’s development, but it has also exposed the region to an outflow of 
value to the host countries of foreign companies. The inflow of foreign 
investment must be measured against the outflow of income earned by the 
foreign companies from their operations in the Central and Eastern European 
region. The macroeconomic indicator of the resultant effects is the difference 
between the gross national income and gross domestic product, which tells us 
the annual value generated and the value “utilized” internally.  
As documented, except for the initial phase when foreign companies took 
advantage of the privatization programs that made available a huge supply of 
previously state-owned assets, the region has witnessed a substantial and growing 
outflow of profits, rents and dividends abroad. In 2011, Czech Republic incomes 
collected by the foreign companies from their subsidiaries represented 7% of the 
gross domestic product, 5% in Estonia and 5% in Hungary. In Poland this share was 
also high at 4.5 %. One needs to keep in mind that these are estimates and the actual 
numbers could be higher. Besides, looking at the trends of the last decade these 
shares are on the rise in most of the economies. 
The faster growth rate in the “converging economies” has been driven by 
acceleration of exports that allowed them to produce trade surpluses. China is 
again a model example, while in Central Europe trade deficits are registered 
almost uniformly, including in Poland, which is the fastest growing economy in 
the region. Also, the stiffer import competition from Western Europe limits 
employment opportunities. Another factor is that Eastern Europe’s foreign trade 
is centred on Germany, which notoriously runs large surpluses with its partners. 
This has a repressive impact on the region’s deficit-running economies across 
Europe. Central and Eastern Europe (with Russia and Ukraine) are all still in 
search of a “growth strategy” that would put them on sustainable path toward  
a convergence trajectory. 
4. Conclusions 
Overall, during the last two decades Central and Eastern European growth 
rates have not produced any visible convergence with Western Europe. Their rates 
sharply contrast with the growth performance of other “emerging markets”. 
During the two last decades the “emerging markets” collectively grew at a rate at 
22                                              Joanna Poznańska, Kazimierz Poznański                                             
least twice as high as the world average (Poznański 2011). A statistical comparison 
reveals that Central Europe as a region grew at 1/3 of the rates reported by the most 
robust “emerging markets” from other parts of the world, like China and Vietnam. 
Poland, and to lesser extent Slovenia, are notable exceptions with growth rates 
within the benchmark for convergence. However, even Poland is no match for the 
fastest growing “emerging markets”, with China of course being the greatest 
success story and rapidly closing the productivity and income gap. Importantly, 
except for Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia, during 1989–2014 the growth rates of 
the other economies of Central Europe were less than in Western Europe 
combined. Those in South Central Europe (excluding Albania) were lower as 
well, with some even negative, all cases indicating a lack of convergence. Such  
a demand factor as wage repression might be one reason behind Central Europe’s 
slower growth, as well as the continuous trade deficits. Restricted access to credit 
from largely foreign-owned banking could be another culprit. Also, the large scale 
emigration to seek work in Western Europe, combined with high – often double 
digit – rates of unemployment might contribute as well. Understanding the Polish 
exception is a challenge to economists studying the region, as is the case of 
Slovenia, which is converging on Western Europe.  
References 
Estrin S. (2009), The effects of privatization and ownership in transition economies, ʻJournal of 
Economic Literatureʼ, 47 (3). 
Haiyue L. and Poznanska J., (2015), Korean FDI in China: Impact on Bilateral Trade, International 
Trade and Finance Association Conference, Saratoga, FL, (conference paper). 
Gabor H. (2012), Diverging patterns of FDI recovery, Vienna: WIIW. 
Kornai J. (2006), The great transformation of Central Eastern Europe. Success and disappointment, 
ʻEconomics of Transitionʼ. 
Podkaminer L. (2013), Development patterns of Central and East European Countries, Vienna: WIIW. 
Poznanska J. (2006), The Impact of Globalization on Economic Transition in China, [in:] K. Fatemi 
(ed.), Globalization Opportunities and Challenges in East Asia, Binghampton: Haworth Press. 
Poznanski K. (2011), Patterns of Transition, Vienna: WIIW Monthly Report, No. 3. 
Poznanski K. (2012), State condition, foreign influence and alternative models of market reforms 
in China, Russia and Eastern Europe, ʻInternational Critical Thoughtʼ, vol.1, No. 3. 
Price & Waterhouse, 2010, “Foreign direct investment in Central and Eastern Europe” (March). 
World Bank 2008, Foreign banks in the developing world, [in:] Global Development Finance: 
Review, analysis and outlook, Washington D.C.: World Bank. 
                                               Comparison Of Patterns Of Convergence...                                     23 
Streszczenie 
 
PORÓWNANIE PRZEBIEGU PROCESÓW KONWERGENCJI WE 
„WSCHODZACYCH GOSPODARKACH” EUROPY ŚRODKOWO 
-WSCHODNIEJ ORAZ AZJI ŚRODKOWEJ 
 
W oparciu o przeprowadzoną analizę wskaźników wzrostu gospodarczego w latach 
1989–2011 w artykule dokonano rozróżnienia pomiędzy „gospodarkami wschodzącymi 
(„emerging markets”) z obszaru Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej (z uwzględnieniem Rosji)  
a innymi gospodarkami mieszczącymi się w tej kategorii. W wyniku reform wprowadzanych od 
1989 roku gospodarki tego regionu upodobniły się pod względem instytucjonalnym do innych 
„gospodarek wschodzących”, jednakże bez oczekiwanego wpływu na tempo wzrostu 
gospodarczego. Cechą charakterystyczną typowych „gospodarek wschodzących” jest tempo 
wzrostu pozwalające na zmniejszenie dystansu dzielącego je od „gospodarek rozwiniętych”.  
W odróżnieniu od tych „gospodarek wschodzących”, które weszły na ścieżkę konwergencji, 
kraje Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej jak dotąd rozwijały się zbyt wolno, aby zacząć się 
zbliżać do poziomu dobrobytu obserwowanego w „gospodarkach rozwiniętych”. Dzięki 
podwojeniu realnego dochodu narodowego w latach 1989–2011 Polska stała się jedynym 
krajem regionu, który skraca dystans rozwojowy. Drugim państwem zmniejszającym dystans 
rozwojowy jest Słowenia. Natomiast wiele krajów praktycznie straciło dwie dekady bądź nie 
redukując istniejącego dystansu rozwojowego bądź odnotowując jego dalsze zwiększenie 
(np. Serbia, Ukraina). Wyniki przeprowadzonej analizy mogą mieć poważne implikacje dla 
teorii ekonomii oraz dla zrozumienia globalizacji jako siły, która z założenia prowadzi do 
unifikacji poziomu dobrobytu w skali światowej. 
 
Słowa kluczowe: globalizacja; konwergencja; Europa Centralna i Wschodnia; gospodarki 
wschodzace, podział dochodu, struktura własności 
 
